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Abstract
In the last few years the Internet of Things (IoT) has seen widespread applic-
ation and can be found in each field. Authentication and access control are
important and critical functionalities in the context of IoT to enable secure
communication between devices. Mobility, dynamic network topology and
weak physical security of low power devices in IoT networks are possible
sources for security vulnerabilities. It is promising to make an authentication
and access control attack resistant and lightweight in a resource constrained
and distributed IoT environment. This paper presents the Identity Authen-
tication and Capability based Access Control (IACAC) model with protocol
evaluation and performance analysis. To protect IoT from man-in-the-middle,
replay and denial of service (Dos) attacks, the concept of capability for ac-
cess control is introduced. The novelty of this model is that, it presents an
integrated approach of authentication and access control for IoT devices. The
results of other related study have also been analyzed to validate and support
our findings. Finally, the proposed protocol is evaluated by using security
protocol verification tool and verification results shows that IACAC is se-
cure against aforementioned attacks. This paper also discusses performance
analysis of the protocol in terms of computational time compared to other
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existing solutions. Furthermore, this paper addresses challenges in IoT and
security attacks are modelled with the use cases to give an actual view of IoT
networks.
Keywords: access control, authentication, capability, Internet of Things.
1 Introduction
In the Internet of Things (IoT) [1, 2], every virtual and physical entity is com-
municable, addressable and is accessible through the Internet. These virtual
and physical entities produce seamless communication and seamless service
collaborating with users and other devices creating service oriented networks.
The IoT is an emerging paradigm and makes the world of computing fully
ubiquitous creating UbiComp, a term initially coined by Mark Weiser [3].
Due to rapid development in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [4]
technology, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), actuators and mobile com-
munication, it is possible to realize the IoT due to ubiquitous interactions
between things and devices in an “anytime, anywhere and anything” form.
Any “thing” with sensing, communication and computation capability
helps us to realize the IoT vision and there are many application areas
possible due to these smart thing or objects. These IoT applications are
categorized in four domains in [5]:
• Personal and Home – includes individual homes [6].
• Enterprise – includes scales of community [7].
• Utilities – includes national and regional scales [8].
• Mobile – includes IoT applications spread across multi-domain due to
distributed connectivity and scale [9].
An example application area is intelligent home environment (personal)
which mainly consists of places full of things that will interact with each
other at different levels. There are different kinds of sensors and devices that
use heterogeneous technologies; low bandwidth meshes networking based
(such as ZigBee and Z-Wave) or other high bandwidth demanding (such as
Bluetooth, WiFi, 4G or UWB) providing 24 × 7 monitoring or entertainment
services. Other application area includes nomadic access to services where
accessible services are discovered according to the user’s identity and profile
with the help of a mobile device. eHealth is the most important application of
IoT, where sensors, actuators, RFID tags, etc., are applied in the health sector
to facilitate ease of life service across geographic and time barriers.
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The main challenges in these application areas are to ensure that ubi-
quitous access to services and monitoring data is granted to identities that
fulfil the access control rules for identity management, heterogeneous device
interaction, authorization, mutual authentication and secure delegation from
a mobile device, and the secure data access. Securing user interactions with
IoT is essential if the notion of “things everywhere” is to succeed. In such a
scenario, security and privacy are two key challenges [10] that will determine
the success or failure of a connected world.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
technological challenges and security challenges that need to be addressed to
realize the notion of IoT. Section 3 presents the related works in authentic-
ation and access control. Threat analysis and attack modelling is presented
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the proposed scheme for mutual authentic-
ation and access control. Evaluation of the proposed scheme using protocol
verification tool and performance analysis is presented in Section 6. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper with future work.
2 Challenges
As outlined in the scenarios and the applications above, it is clear that we
are transforming from an Internet of computers to the Internet of things with
device to device communication. In order to make the IoT services available
at low cost with a large number of devices communicating to each other,
there are many challenges to overcome. These challenges are divided into
two categories in this paper as:
• Technological challenges – These challenges are related to under-
lined wireless technologies, energy, scalability, distributed and dynamic
nature of IoT and ubiquitous interactions.
• Security challenges – These challenges are related to security services
like authentication, privacy, trustworthiness and confidentiality. Security
challenges also include heterogeneous communication and end-to-end
security.
2.1 Technological Challenges
• Wireless Communication: IoT significantly uses convergence of estab-
lished wireless technologies such as GSM, UMTS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth
and WPAN. These underlined wireless technologies use different stand-
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ards and have different communication bandwidth requirement. This
convergence also creates serious interoperability issues.
• Scalability: Unbounded number of devices creates the larger scope and
scalability in IoT than conventional communication networks. IoT cov-
ers large application areas like a home environment where number of
devices are relatively small in number to a factory or building that has a
large number of devices offering multiple services to the users. IPV6 is
one attempt to accommodate as many numbers of devices and things in
IoT.
• Energy: IoT consist of constrained objects which do not have enough
power, memory and computation capabilities. Designing lightweight
protocols for IoT which minimize energy consumption is very important
as compared to conventional protocols running on devices with sufficient
resources.
• Distributed and Dynamic Nature: In IoT, things can interact with other
things at any time, from anywhere and in any way independent of the
location. As the IoT networks are distributed in nature, designing proto-
cols for them is a challenging task. The objects interact dynamically and
hence appropriate services for the objects must be automatically identi-
fied. In addition to this, the mobility/roaming of the objects is another
important challenge.
• Identification: In the IoT, things include variety of objects like com-
puters, sensor nodes, people, vehicles, medicines, books, etc. These
things should be uniquely identified for the addressing capabilities and
for providing a means to communicate with each other. After verify-
ing the identities of things, we call these uniquely identified things
as objects. Different identity schemes have been proposed for the IoT
and it is predicted that it is dubious to have common identification
schemes globally. Identification schemes like RFID Object Identifier,
EPCglobal, Short-OID and Near Field Communications Forum, IPV4,
IPV6 and E.164 have been studied in the literature. These addressing
methods/principles are highly depends on the underlined access techno-
logy, thus it is challenging to have many different addressing protocols
for varied underline access technologies.
2.2 Security Challenges
• Privacy: Privacy is one of the most sensitive areas in the context of IoT.
In IoT, all objects are connected to the Internet and they communicate
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with each other over the Internet. Hence the privacy issue is critical. As
the Internet gets diversified with new types of devices and heterogeneous
networks, IoT users and devices have to access the digital world with
wide range of methods and protocols. Further, as ownership of these
devices by the users does not exist, the issue of privacy is aggravated.
• Identity Management: Due to the scale of economics in the IoT, un-
bounded numbers of things or objects are involved in accessing IoT
networks and communicating with each other. Hence, efficient and light-
weight identity management schemes are required. In addition to this,
the distributed nature of IoT makes this problem more challenging.
• Trust: Trust is an essential and integral factor to consider when imple-
menting IoT. In an uncertain IoT environment, trust plays an important
role in establishing secure communication between things. There should
be an effective mechanism to define trust in a dynamic and collaborat-
ive IoT environment. It is also important to provide context aware trust
management for varied IoT applications.
• End-to-End Security: End-to-end security measures between IoT
devices and Internet hosts are equally important. Applying crypto-
graphic schemes for encryption and authentication codes to a packet is
not sufficient for the resource constrained IoT. Hence future research is
required into efficient end-to-end security measures between IoT and the
Internet.
• Authentication and Access Control: Authentication is identity estab-
lishment between communicating parties. Authentication and access
control is important to establish secure communication between mul-
tiple devices and services. Interoperability and backward compatibility
are the two key issues to be addressed. For example, in Wi-Fi roaming,
devices use UMTS at the core networks.
• Attack Resistant Security Solution: Due to diversity of devices and end
users, there should be attack resistant and lightweight security solutions.
All the devices in IoT have low memory and limited computation re-
sources, thus they are vulnerable to resource enervation attack. When
the devices join and commissioned into the network, keying material,
security and domain parameters could be eavesdropped. Possible ex-
ternal attacks like denial of service attack, flood attack, etc., on device
and mitigation plan to address these attacks is another big challenge.
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3 Related Works
There is ongoing research in the field of authentication and access control.
This section presents state of the art in authentication and access control.
3.1 Authentication
There is much research done in the area of securing IoT. There is closely
related work done in the MAGNET project [11, 12] where security associ-
ations take place with increased communication overhead and authentication
is left unaddressed. The authors presented a distributed access control solu-
tion based on security profiles but attack resistance is not explored. In [13,
14], the authors have presented an ECC based authentication protocol but the
major disadvantage is that it is not Denial of Service (DoS) attack resistant.
As there are billions of devices in IoT, resistance to DoS attack is of vital im-
portance. In [15], the author addressed the problem of secure communication
and authentication based on a shared key and is applicable to limited location
and cannot be used for wide area. It addresses peer to peer authentication but
cannot be extended to a resource constrained environment.
There has been lot of debate about which of the cryptographic prim-
itives like public key or private key is suitable for the IoT. Most of the
research has mainly focused in areas like WSN and applications like health-
care and smart home. Many security mechanisms have been proposed based
on private key cryptographic primitives due to fast computation and energy
efficiency. Scalability problem and memory requirement to store keys makes
it inefficient for heterogeneous devices in IoT.
A public key cryptography based solution overcomes these challenges
because of its high scalability, low memory requirements and no require-
ment of key pre-distribution infrastructure. In [16], the author presented ECC
based mutual authentication protocol for IoT using hash functions. Mutual
authentication is achieved between terminal node and platform using secret
key cryptosystem introducing the problem of key management and storage.
Self-certified keys cryptosystem based distributed user authentication scheme
for WSN is presented in [17], where only user nodes are authenticated. How-
ever, this is not lightweight solution for IoT. In [18], the author presented an
authentication with parameter passing during the handshake. The handshake
process is time consuming and based on symmetric key cryptography with
more memory requirement for large prime numbers. Efficient identification
and authentication is presented in [19] and is based on the signal properties
of the node but it is not suitable for mobile nodes. The direction of the signal
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is considered as a parameter for node authentication but it takes more time
to decide the signal direction with more memory and computations involved.
In [20], cluster based authentication is proposed which is most suited for the
futuristic IoT, but an attacker can get hold of the distribution of system key
pairs and cluster key. Generation of random numbers and signatures creates
considerable computational overhead consuming memory resources.
Mobility is very important aspect of mobile and wireless communica-
tion and essentially in the context of IoT. With the heterogeneous network
topologies like Wi-Fi, LTE and WiMax, authenticated service delivery with
proper access control in place on the fly is a big challenge. Wireless Internet
Service Provider roaming (WISPr) [21, 22] is an architecture, which proposes
detailed specifications for allowing inter-operator roaming for Wi-Fi clients.
Roaming functionalities in the vendor devices is based on the IANA Private
Enterprise Number (PEN). WISPr enables users for roaming between differ-
ent wireless Internet service providers. WISPr uses Remote Authentication
Dial in User Service (RADIUS) [23] to provide centralized authentication
and authorization. Analysis and security vulnerabilities of RADIUS have
been discussed in [24] due to its centralized nature. Extensible Authentic-
ation Protocol (EAP) [25] is authentication framework being used in Wi-Fi.
Security assessments of EAP have been discussed in [26] and explored many
weakness points. Especially EAP do not address mutual authentication and
not resistant to replay attack [26]. Key replication and replay attack on Au-
thenticated Key Agreement (AKA) have been presented in [27] which clearly
shows that there is even an identity is associated with AKA, it is prone to
attack. Comparative studies on authentication and key agreement methods for
802.11 wireless LANs is presented in [28]. Weaknesses and security assess-
ment of various authentication methods in the context of wireless networks
is very well presented in [28]. General requirements for authentication and
key agreement are classified into three mutually exclusive sets as: mandatory,
recommended and additional requirements. A multi-layer agreement protocol
is also proposed in [28]. This state of the art in mobile and Wi-Fi environ-
ment clearly shows that there is a need of flexible and secure authentication
scheme.
State of the art evaluation is shown in Table 1. Related work is sum-
marized based on the parameters like mutual authentication, lightweight
solution, resistant to attacks, distributed nature and access control solution.
Recent related work in the area of authentication for IoT is considered for the
evaluation and is presented below.
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Table 1 State of the art evaluation summary.
From Table 1, it is clear that not all existing solutions for authentication
fulfil each and every requirement for IoT. The NO block in Table 1 represents
the respective feature unavailability in the corresponding solution. Evaluation
summary of the state of the art shows that all existing authentication solution
in Wi-Fi environment and in the context of IoT do not address all the re-
quirements like attack resistant, mobility and lightweight solution and mutual
authentication.
3.2 Access Control
Controlling access to information or resources is usually done by defining
access control rules, which decide who is allowed to access what and who is
not. These rules take different forms such as RBACs, ACLs, policies, and so
on. Before the development of standards based policy languages, interoperab-
ility was a major concern. It was with the emergence of the XACML proposal
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[29], defined by OASIS, that identity management developers started think-
ing about how to make use of such standards based languages to define the
set of policies, and to provide more standard solutions. In the IoT world,
such standards based solutions are imperative due the distributed nature of
the problem. XACML includes an XACML delegation profile in order to
support administrative and dynamic delegation. The purpose of this profile
is to specify how to express permissions about the right to issue policies
and to verify issued policies against these permissions. This profile led to
an identity federation scenario, is the key element upon the management
of delegation policies. At the moment there is not a solution to define the
relationship among the involved institution in a service interaction, neither
a way to combine the decision taken by different organizations. There is
currently no standard proposal related with the establishment of agreement
at organization, federation or other trust domains levels. Examples of this
kind of policies could be common information representation format, security
requirements, levels of trusts, etc. This policy can be taken as a starting point
for the definition of a negotiation mechanism about capabilities and policies,
independently of the kind of entity involved on it. Policy and Charging Con-
trol (PCC) in LTE enables centralized mechanism for charging control and
service-aware quality of service. PCC operates in S9 interface and consist
of Policy and Charging Rule Function (PCRF) which controls the policies
dynamically based on subscriptions and sessions between home PCRF and
visited PCRF. Consider the scenarios of heterogeneous home M2M network
in IoT based on LTE/4G. In this scenario, home gateway proactively and
adaptively interacts with the surrounding radios in order to connect to home
network and in turn to the external networks. Security policies protect the
home M2M network from possible external attack via trusted access control
and networked encryption technique.
Although XACML was the starting point towards the definition of stand-
ard policies, it is only focused on the resource access control type of policy.
More or less at the same time, other kind of policies emerged to cover specific
aspects for identity management, for example P3P [30], to define online pri-
vacy release information policies between end users and services. Current
systems have incorporated these kinds of standard policies in some way,
for example Shibboleth [31] and Liberty Alliance [32] providing definition
of access control policies by means of XACML. However, there is a need
to define policies in a standard way in the next generation of policy-driven
systems when distributed scenarios in the IoT domain are considered.
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It is equally important to discuss the state of the art in access control
solutions. Traditionally, access control is represented by Access Control Mat-
rix (ACM), in which the column of ACM is basically a list of objects or
resources to be accessed and the row is a list of subjects or whoever wants to
access the resource. From this ACM, two traditional access control models
exist, i.e. Access Control List (ACL) and capability based access control.
Many scientists [33, 34] have made comparisons between ACL and cap-
ability based access control and the conclusion is that ACL suffers from a
confused deputy problem and other security threats while it is not the case
in the capability based access control. Moreover, ACL is not scalable being
centralized in nature and also it is prone to single point of failure. It cannot
support different level of granularity and revocation is time consuming with
lack of security. However, several drawbacks have been identified in applying
the original concept of capability based model into access control model as it
is to IoT. Gong [35] pointed out two major drawbacks of classical capability
based model namely the capability propagation and revocation, and provide
solutions to them by proposing a so called Secure Identity based Capability
System (ICAP). Yet, Gong [35] did not clearly describe the security policy
that is used in the capability creation and propagation. It also did not consider
context information in making access control decision upon access request
from a subject or user.
Nowadays Internet and web based applications are widely used and dif-
ferent types of access control models have appeared, such as Role Based
Access Control (RBAC), Context Aware Access Control (CWAC), Policy
Based Access Control, etc. Among others, RBAC is considered to be the most
famous access control method in terms of the usage and implementation. In
[36–42] extensions of the RBAC model are presented. As mentioned in [34],
the RBAC model is essentially a variation of identity based access control to
which ACL is sometimes referred, which seeks to address the burdens of cli-
ent identification. Therefore, the RBAC model is still vulnerable to confused
deputy problem as is the case with an ACL based model. Moreover, due to the
role based structure in RBAC, it is not a generic model. As access permissions
to the entities can be assigned through roles only, it has limited granularity.
Scalability and delegation is critical in RBAC and it is not time efficient for
micro level access. In [37], the authors presented General Temporal RBAC
(GTRBAC), a RBAC based model that capable in expressing a wide range of
temporal constraints, in particular periodic as well as duration constraints on
roles, user-role assignments, and role-permission assignments. An example
of GTRBAC’s usage in the real world application is in defining access rights
IACAC for the Internet of Things 319
to employees in a company who work based on shifts, e.g. morning, after-
noon, and night shift, and also for people who work on short term contracts,
and many others. However, it is not able to describe the limitation of any
context other than periodic or time duration. Bhatti et al. [38] addressed the
issues in XACML as well as GTRBAC with emphasize in formal definition of
context, and introduction of trust model with RBAC and XML main features.
However, the scope is only limited to web service environments and hence
not really suitable to the IoT. Privacy aware RBAC is presented in [39] and
compared with XACML but its application to IoT is unclear.
In [40–42], the authors addressed the issue of role and/or permission
delegation based on the RBAC model. However, unlike Barka and Sandhu
[40, 41], Hasebe et al. [42] considered delegation of roles and permissions
in a cross-domain environment by using capability, and thus it is called
Capability RBAC (CRBAC) model. The main idea of CRBAC is essentially
similar to what has been proposed in [35], i.e. by using capability transfer
or propagation in order to delegate roles or permissions. However, the main
aim of using capability is limited to delegation only, thus it does not exploit
the capability fully. Moreover, explanation of the revocation of delegation or
capability transfer was not discussed, plus other drawbacks related to [39]
and RBAC as described earlier are also applicable here.
In CWAC [43], the surrounding context of the subject and/or object is
considered to provide access. Scalability is again a problem with CWAC.
Delegation and revocation is not supported completely in CWAC. In CRBAC
[44], context is integrated with RBAC dynamically. Context is defined as
characterization of surrounding entities for performing appropriate actions.
Improper association of context and role results in scalability and time in-
efficiency. Further, the delegation is not simple due to context dependency.
There are many examples like context aware patient information system and
context aware music player where applying role based access control is a
cumbersome process.
Comparison of these access control models is shown in Table 2. Com-
parison is based on functional parameters such as generic nature, scalability,
granularity, delegation, time efficiency, and security.
State of the art for authentication and access control shows that there is
no integrated protocol for authentication and access control. The objective
is to achieve mutual identity establishment, i.e. authentication and once au-
thenticated, access control will take place. This paper proposes a new method
of authentication of devices and access control for the IoT resources using
public key approach with scalability and less memory requirements. The most
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Table 2 Comparison of different access control models.
important design issue of IoT is the mobility of heterogeneous devices and
proposed scheme works efficiently for this need.
4 Threats and Attacks Modelling
An important endeavour of this paper is to model the activities of IoT attacks
to understand the sequence of actions taking place when the attacks are hap-
pening. The modelling of the security attacks helps to understand an actual
view of the IoT networks and enable us to decide the mitigation plans.
In the IoT, the possible communications are device to device, human
to device and human to human giving connection between heterogeneous
entities or networks. Figure 1 presents general use case of IoT, where Mo-
bileEntity(x): A mobile device represents an entity, i.e. any device in the
network which communicates with other entities of same type or of differ-
ent type via Internet or direct. MobileEntity 1, 2, 3 represent three different
and most probable scenarios in the system of communication. Use Cases are
self-explanatory and attackers are at the top of the diagram.
• Man-in-the-Middle Attack: When the devices are commissioned into
a network, keying material,security and domain parameters could be
eavesdropped. Keying material can reveal the secret key between
devices and authenticity of the communication channel could be com-
promised. Man-in-the-middle attack is one type of eavesdropping pos-
sible in the commissioning phase of devices to IoT. The key estab-
lishment protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack and can
compromise device authentication as devices usually do not have prior
knowledge about each other. As device authentication involves exchange
of device identities, identity theft is possible due to man-in-the-middle
attack. Sample use case for man-in-the-middle attack is shown in
Figure 2.
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Figure 1 IoT use case.
• Denial of Service Attack: All the devices in IoT have low memory
and limited computation resources, thus they are vulnerable to resource
enervation attack. Attackers can send messages or requests to specific
device so as to consume their resources. This attack is more daunting in
IoT since attacker might be single in number and resource constrained
devices are large in numbers. DoS attack is also possible due to man-in-
the-middle attack. Sample use case of DoS in IoT scenario is shown in
Figure 2.
• Replay Attack: During the exchange of identity related information or
other credentials in IoT, this information can be spoofed, altered or re-
played to repel network traffic. This causes a very serious replay attack.
Replay attack is essentially one form of active man-in-the-middle attack.
Our solution prevents replay attacks by maintaining the freshness of
random number, for example by using time stamp or nonce by including
Message Authentication Code (MAC) as well. A sample use case is
shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 IoT security attacks modelling.
For this purpose, authentication and access control are main security is-
sues which are to be addressed. This paper presents an integrated lightweight
solution for authentication and access control with the protocol evaluation.
5 Proposed IACAC Model
As stated earlier, mobility is very important aspect of wireless communica-
tion and essentially in the context of IoT. With the heterogeneous network
topologies like Wi-Fi, LTE and WiMax, authenticated service delivery with
proper access control is major problem to be addressed. Wireless Internet
Service Provider roaming (WISPr) [21, 22] and RADIUS [23] are the ex-
isting solutions to provide centralized authentication and authorization in
Wi-Fi. Related work in security analysis [24–28] shows that there is a need
of attack resistant and integrated approach for authentication and access con-
trol. Security flaws of authentication and access control protocols have been
studied in [45] in the context of mobile communication. Required goals for
IACAC for the Internet of Things 323
authentication protocols between mobile entities and fixed networks have
been presented in [46], which includes mutual authentication, confidentiality
and the attack resistance. Hybrid cryptography based authentication scheme
is presented in [47], which is prone to attack on key share and replay attack.
Aziz and Diffie [48] proposed mobile authentication and key agreement pro-
tocol based on public key cryptography, but it is prone to impersonation attack
[49]. The Wong–Chan mobile authentication protocol [50] is vulnerable to
DoS attack where malicious initiator can disturb the execution of protocol
through bogus request. This makes the Wong–Chan scheme not suitable for
resource constrained environment.
This paper presents an Identity Authentication and Capability based Ac-
cess Control (IACAC) scheme for the IoT to replace the existing schemes.
IACAC is compatible with underline access technologies like Bluetooth, 4G,
WiMax and Wi-Fi. IACAC presented in this paper is implemented in a Wi-Fi
environment and the performance results are discussed in next sections.
The algorithm presented in this paper addresses both authentication and
access control which are divided into three parts:
• Secret key generation based on Elliptical Curve Cryptography-Diffie
Hellman algorithm (ECCDH),
• Identity establishment,
• Capability creation for access control.
5.1 Secret Key Generation Based on ECCDH and Identity
Establishment for Authentication
There is considerable interest in ECC for IoT security [51]. It has advantages
of small key size and low computation overhead. It uses public key crypto-
graphy approach based on elliptic curve on finite fields. ECCDH [51] is a
symmetric key agreement protocol that allows two devices that have no prior
knowledge about each other to establish a shared secret key which can be
used in any security algorithm. Using this public parameter and own private
parameter, these parties can calculate the shared secret. Any third party, who
does not have access to the private details of each device, cannot calculate the
shared secret from available public information. All devices joining IoT share
key pairs during the bootstrapping. The IACAC scheme presented in this pa-
per is also applicable to security bootstrapping. Security bootstrapping is the
process by which devices join the IoT with respect to location and time. It in-
cludes device authentication along with credential transfer. Protocol uses one
or more trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC) to generate domain paramet-
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Figure 3 ECCDH for establishing shared secret key.
ers and other security material and important part is this KDC is not required
to be online always. Initially KDC randomly selects particular elliptic curve
over finite field GF(p) where p is a prime and makes base point P with
large order q (where q is also prime). KDC then picks random x ∈ GF(p)
as a private key and publishes corresponding public key Q = x × P . KDC
generates random number Ki ∈ GF(p) as a private key for device i and
generates corresponding public key Qi = Ki × P . The key pair {Qi,Ki} is
given to device i. With the increasing number of devices, KDC can generate
an ECC key pair based on base point P for any number of devices as it is
rich in terms of resources as compared to other devices in IoT. These ECC
key pairs will be used to share common secret key for secure communication
using ECCDH and is explained below. Steps of aforementioned ECCDH are
shown presented in Figure 3.
The assumption here is that ECC is running at trusted KDC. There is an
agreement on system based point P and generate (Qu,Ku) and (Qh,Kh)
pairs where Qu is the Public key of Device 1; Ku is the secret key of Device
1; Qh is the public key of Device 2; and Kh is the secret key of Device 2.
Furthermore, P is large prime number over GF(P ) and generations of above
keys are shown in Figure 3.
No parameter is disclosed in this process of establishing a shared secret
key other than domain parameter P and public keys. In this paper, we con-
sider sensor nodes as a device, because the functionalities and operational
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principle of wireless sensor networks makes it an appropriate and mandatory
candidate of the IoT.
5.2 Protocol for Identity Authentication
5.2.1 One Way Authentication
One way authentication authenticates Device 1 to Device 2 and is explained
below. As per above ECCDH, both Device 1 and Device 2 have Xuh as a
common secret key. Device 1 selects r ∈ GF(P ) which will be used to
create session key. Tu is generated as a time stamp by Device 1. It is assumed
that synchronization is taken care using appropriate mechanism. The secret
key is created by Device 1 as L = h(Xuh ⊕ Tu). Then Device 1 encrypts r
with secret key L as R = EL(r) and encrypts Tu by Xuh as Tus = EXuh(Tu).
After this Device 1 builds a Message Authentication Code (MAC) value as
MAC1 = MAC(Xuh, R‖ICAP1) where ICAP1 is a data structure representing
an identity based capability for this Device 1 giving access rigts. Details about
ICAP are given in the same section below. Now Device 1 sends the following
parameters to Device 2 directly or through gateway node/coordination node
or access point as (R, Tus, MAC1). Device 2 generates its current time stamp
as T current and Device 2 will decrypt Tus to get Tu and compare it with
Tcurrent. If Tcurrent > Tu, it is valid. Now Device 2 calculates L and decrypts
R to get r. Device 2 also calculates the MAC′1 and it will verify this with the
MAC1 received from Device 1. If valid, then Device 1 is authentic to Device
2. Device 1 also matches the ICAP1 received with ICAP2 stored at Device 2.
If Device 2 gets a match with R, MAC1, Tus , then Device 1 is authenticated
to Device 2. This protocol is presented in Figure 4.
5.2.2 Mutual Authentication
This part of authentication authenticates Device 2 to Device 1, and is ex-
plained in Figure 5. Device 2 builds a MAC as MAC2 = MAC(r‖ICAP2)
and also encrypts r with Xuh as R′ = EXuh(r). Device 2 sends (R′, MAC2)
to Device 1. Device 1 verifies MAC2 and decrypts R′ and compares received
r with this r (denoted as r ′ and r ′′ in Figure 5). If a match is found, Device 2 is
also authenticated to Device 1 and communication and access will be granted
based on the ICAP2. This protocol achieves both mutual authentication along
with capability based access control in secure way.
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Figure 4 One way authentication protocol.
Figure 5 Protocol for mutual authentication.
5.2.3 Capability Creation for Access Control
Conceptually, a capability is a token that gives permission to access device.
A capability is implemented as a data structure that contains two items of
information: a unique device identifier and access rights. A capability struc-
ture is presented in Figure 6. For simplicity, it is sufficient to examine the
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Figure 6 Capability structure.
case where a capability describes a set of access rights for the device. The
device which may also contain security attributes such as access rights or
other access control information. The ICAP [35] was essentially extending
the capability system concept, in which the capability is used by any user or
subject that wants to get access to a certain device or resource.
If the capability that is presented by the subject matches with the capab-
ility that is stored in the device or an entity that manages the device, access is
granted. However, unlike the classical capability based system, ICAP intro-
duced the identity of subject or user in its operation. In this way, it claimed
to reduce the number of capabilities stored in the so-called “Object Server”,
“Gateway” or “Access Point” and thus offers more scalability. Moreover, it
has better control in capability propagation which provides more efficient
access later on. The ICAP structure and how capability is used for access
control is shown in Figure 6. ICAP is represented as
ICAP = (ID, AR, Rnd) (1)
where ID presents the device identifier; AR the set of access rights for the
device with device identifier as ID; and Rnd the random number to prevent
forgery and is a result of one way hash function as: Rnd = f (ID, AR). In
IACAC, access rights are sent in the form of a MAC value in the authen-
tication process. Implementation works in two stages. First, the devices are
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Figure 7 High level functioning of CAC.
connected with each other through the use of an access point and then the
capability based access is allowed to the other device through Capability
based Access Control (CAC). Each communication that is to be established
is verified by its capability access. Only after the capability verification the
devices are able to communicate with each other. Any device wants to com-
municate with other device is able to initiate the communication by sending
the request to a specific device. The second stage is to verify whether that
requesting device is having the capability to communicate with called device.
This access right gets checked using the capability of that device which is
associated with every device. For sending capability message digest using
SHA-1 is generated for each device as stated earlier and the remote device
will check its validity using SHA-1. Figure 7 depicts high level functioning
of CAC.
The complete CAC scheme is presented in Figure 8. Figure 8 shows ac-
cess based on CAC between two Wi-Fi devices. In this paper, we treat all
devices as subjects and resources to be accessed as objects. In this imple-
mentation of CAC, file is considered as object for access. Access rights (AR)
is given as
AR ∈ {Read, Write, NULL} (2)
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AR can either be {Read}, {Write}, {Read, Write} or {NULL}. If AR =
{NULL}, the permission to access particular object is not allowed. Once
the capability is verified against forgery, both devices are able to perform
an operation as specified in capability and access is granted. As any device
can perform only those operations as specified in capability, principle of least
privilege is supported to a large extent.
6 IACAC Evaluation and Analysis
6.1 Protocol Evaluation
The evaluation will focus on identity authentication in terms of one way and
mutual as the most important processes in the authentication. The Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool
[52] based on the Dolev–Yao model [53] is used for model and protocol veri-
fication. We implement the aforementioned protocol in stages. The first stage
of protocol authenticates Device 1 to Device 2, i.e. one way authentication,
and the second stage is for mutual authentication, i.e. authenticates Device 2
to Device 1. The verification results are described below.
6.1.1 Evaluation Procedure
In order to carry out the evaluation using AVISPA some assumptions are
made. Both devices have already obtained ECC based shared key using
Diffie–Hellman (ECCDH). As stated earlier, assumption here is that KDC is
secure and trusted. Complete protocol evaluation is presented in the following
model:
D1 → D2 : [R, Tus, MAC1]; [{r}L, {Tu} Xuh, RND1]
D1 ← D2 : [R′, MAC2]; [{r} Xuh, RND2]
where D1 is Device 1; D2 is Device 2; { } presents a symbol of encryption;
Tu is the timestamp generated as a nonce; Xuh is a shared key between D1
and D2 using ECCDH; r is some value x ∈ GF(p); RND1 is the MAC value
of Xuh,R and ICAP1 where ICAP is the result of a one way hash function
f (Device ID, Access Rights, Rnd), Rnd is a random number generated to
prevent forgery; RND2 is the MAC value of r and ICAP2; and L presents the
result of one way hash function (XOR of Xuh and Tu).
Besides this, the Dolev–Yao intruder model has been introduced in the
evaluation. The intruder is assumed to have knowledge of the following:
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Figure 8 Proposed CAC scheme for IoT.
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• ID: Device identifier,
• f ( ): Knowledge of one way hash function.
6.1.2 Evaluation Results
The goal of evaluation is to verify protocol for attacks mentioned above and
ensures mutual authentication along with the access control.
Mutual authentication: Xuh is shared securely between D1 and D2, and
r is provided by trusted KDC to both the devices. Consequently, D1 is au-
thenticated to D2 as only D2 can decrypt R and Tus . Also MAC can be
calculated only by D2 and D2 is sending the encrypted r to authenticate it to
D1. Verification results show that secure mutual authentication is achieved.
Man-in-the-middle attack: In case of authentication, even there is a man-
in-the-middle attack on R, Tus , MAC1 parameters; the attacker will not reveal
any information. AVISPA shows that authentication protocol is free from at-
tacks. For access control, man-in-the-middle attacks happen when an attacker
eavesdrop the ID and ICAP transmitted, and then a masquerade attack hap-
pens when the attacker uses the stolen ID and CAP. The key to preventing
a masquerade attack from the stolen CAP is to use an ID to validate the
correct device. If the attacker manages to steal the ID, the attack is prevented
by applying public key cryptography to ID, assuming that the authentication
process has been done before access control. In this way, although the attacker
gets the ICAP which is not encrypted, the capability validity check will return
an exception because the one way hash function, f (ID, AR, Rnd) will return
a different result than the one presented in the CAP, without a correct ID.
Another type of man-in-the-middle attack is replay attack. Adversary can
intercept the message sent out from D1. However, it is not possible in IACAC
because it can easily detect by verifying timestamp Tu. If Tu is older than the
predefined threshold value, it is invalid and has been used. If Tu is changed,
MAC1 = MAC(Xuh, R‖ICAP1) is not valid and consistent. For access con-
trol, IACAC prevents the replay attack by maintaining the freshness of Rnd,
for example by using timestamp or nonce by including MAC as well. Even if
the attacker manages to compromise the solution and gets the ICAP, it cannot
use the same capability next time because the validity will be expired.
DoS attack: Upon receiving the message from D1, D2 first checks the
validity of the timestamp. If it is not valid, then D2 discards the message.
Otherwise, it computes a MAC2 value to compare with the received value.
DoS happens when an attacker accesses a particular resource massively and
simultaneously by using the same or different IDs. It is easy to control access
using one ID because the system is able to maintain the session, thus the
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Figure 9 Snapshot showing principle of least privilege.
access of the same ID to the same resource can be restricted to only one
session at a time. The potential of DoS attacks from multiple IDs can be
prevented in the capability propagation process. Therefore, a DoS attack can
be prevented or at least minimized.
Principle of Least Privilege: Security analysis shows that CAC has greater
support for principle of least privilege due to the use of capabilities and hence
it limits the damage when the protection is partially compromised. As access
rights are encapsulated in the process of capability creation, even attacker
or intruder is trying to modify these access rights, capability verification
and comparison process returns false and access is denied. Access control
schemes purely based on the role, context and ACL [44] has not addressed
the principle of least privilege which is an important feature of the access
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control solution. A sample snapshot as in Figure 9 shows that even one device
is trying to perform delete operation which is not included in its capability,
delete operation is denied achieving the principle of least privilege.
6.2 Performance Analysis
6.2.1 IACAC
The security level of protocol presented in this paper depends on the type of
MAC algorithm, encryption algorithm and security level of ECC signature.
We propose to use RC5 stream cipher for encryption, which takes 0.26 ms
on Mica2 motes [54–56]. RC5 is notable for its simplicity for resource con-
strained devices such as IoT and its flexibility due to the built in variability.
Heavy use of data independent rotations and mixture of different operations
provides strong security to RC5 [57]. We propose to use SHA-1 as one way
hash function which takes 3.63 ms on Mica2 motes and it is computationally
expensive to find text which matches given hash and also it is difficult to
two different texts which produces the same hash [54–56]. To generate the
MAC value, we propose CBC-MAC which has advantage of small key size
and small number of block cipher invocations and takes 3.12 ms on Mica2
motes [55]. The time required to generate random number is 0.44 ms and
ECC to perform point multiplication which takes 800 ms on Mica2 motes
[55, 56]. In IACAC protocol as the message length is fixed, CBC-MAC is
most secure [58]. It is clear from these values that maximum time is required
for ECC point multiplication. In IACAC, point multiplication is taking place
at KDC and as KDC is powerful device, computational overhead is trivial as
compared to the sensors. We denote the computational time required for each
operation by device in IoT by following notation:
• DH is the time to perform one way hash function SHA-1;
• DMAC is the time to generate Mac value by CBC-MAC;
• DRC5 is the time to perform encryption and decryption by RC5;
• DMUL is the time to perform ECC point multiplication; and
• R is the time for random number generation.
Table 3 shows the comparison of computational time for the above-
mentioned protocol. The IACAC protocol for mutual authentication and
access control for the IoT devices takes less time (14.28 ms) as compared
to other protocol compared in this paper. Key point to note here is that none
of the work has addressed the issue of authentication and access control as
an integrated solution for IoT. Total computational time for of the proposed
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Table 3 Computational time for an IACAC scheme.
scheme, HBQ [59] and mutual authentication for IoT (IoT Auth) [16] is
shown in Table 3. IoT Auth scheme requires R + DH + 2DMUL time for
mutual authentication which comes approximately 1604.07 ms. The HBQ
scheme takes 2DH + 2DMAC + DRC5 + 3DMUL total time for authentication
which is approximately 2,413.76 ms. Key point to note here is that both
schemes do not address access control after authentication. IACAC takes only
DH + 2DMAC + 2DRC5 which takes only 14.02 ms which is much better than
the other two schemes analyzed in this paper. In IACAC, the 2DH factor
is introduced which comprises time required by one way hash function in
authentication as well as in ICAP to calculate Rnd.
6.2.2 CAC
The performances of independent CAC have also been analyzed to validate
and support our findings. The CAC implementation consists of the capability
creation, object selection once capabilities are verified and denying access if
there no match found for capability. In this paper, files are treated as objects
and operations are performed as mentioned in capabilities. Operations are
Read, Write, Read and Write, or NULL operations as explained earlier.
As stated earlier, the CAC scheme is implemented in Wi-Fi for Laptop
devices. To check the performance of CAC in terms of Access Time (AT),
different laptop devices of same configuration are used and AT is averaged
for all devices. In this paper, AT is a function of latency and is defined as
Access Time (AT) = f (L) (3)
where L is latency of access and defined as an overhead in terms of com-
putational time to access right resource on right device. The unit of AT is
milliseconds (ms). For measurement, we took the scenario as the two devices
(Laptops) are connected via access point. AT defined in equation (3) is the
time required to access one device to other in one way. Since WLAN is used
and traffic can affect the access delay, multiple measurements are required
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Table 4 Performance comparison of AT.
to consider for evaluation. The three measurement runs have been taken for
calculating the access time. Two devices are discoverable to each other by
the Jgroups [60]. JGroups is a reliable group communication toolkit imple-
mented in Java. It is based on IP multicast, and also provide reliable group
membership, lossless transmission of a message to all recipients, message
ordering. As reliability requirement varies from application to application,
JGroups provides a flexible protocol stack architecture that gives flexibility to
users to put together custom-tailored stacks, ranging from unreliable but fast
to highly reliable but slower stacks. There are two cases for the performance
measure, first is access with capability and second without using capability.
In both cases we considered the same common modules, as device discovery
and file browsing.
Table 4 shows the performance comparison of CAC, AT without capab-
ility and CRBAC [44]. In this paper, we also implemented CRBAC scheme
to check its performance with CAC scheme presented. In [44], programming
framework is presented to model CRBAC. Same programming framework
is implemented in Wi-Fi to get context aware role based access control for
laptop devices. As per the framework presented in the paper, context man-
agement and access control are brought and implemented together to get role
based access control. Performance in terms of AT in milliseconds (ms) is
measured for CRBAC [44] access control scheme and it shows that CAC
works better as compared to CRBAC. CAC take average AT of 364 ms and
AT without capability take 173 ms. Table 4 shows that the CAC scheme takes
extra 191 ms but it provides secure access to devices by avoiding tampering
or forgery of capability with the help of one way hash function. CAC ac-
cess is also attack resistant from replay and man-in-the-middle attack. The
CRBAC scheme takes 410 ms to access the device, which is more than the
CAC scheme. In the CRBAC context dependent role based access is granted
but the access is not secure. It can be concluded from Table 4 that the CAC
scheme gives secure access control with better performance in terms of AT.
Moreover, in a distributed context, like IoT, CAC provides many advant-
ages over traditional or consolidated approaches due to its flexibility, better
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support for least privilege principle and avoidance for replay attack and man-
in-the-middle attack. The chosen approach for the access control based on
the capability concept, and in particular the CAC scheme, is considered in
order to cope with the scalability of IoT system since it is well suited for
providing access control in distributed systems. Besides a proposed access
control model which provides scalability and flexibility, the main contribution
of this paper also includes a secure access control mechanism that have been
tested with a security protocol verification tool. To provide complete security
solution to the identity management in IoT, authentication and access control
are two important security measures.
Furthermore, there are few challenges to implement IACAC in mobile en-
vironment. Access delegation method with security considerations based on
capability based context aware access control scheme intended for federated
IoT networks is presented in [61]. In [61], capability propagation incorporat-
ing context in federated IoT environment with scalability and flexibility for
distributed systems is presented. Authority delegation for mobile and fed-
erated environments is challenging due to dynamic and distributed nature.
Another issue is that, it is necessary to have an established trust relationship
between all entities prior to delegation. IACAC is completely compatible with
the state of the art and it has been tested in Wi-Fi environment as discussed in
the evaluation part of this paper. As the IACAC is addressing device to device
authentication and access control, it is compatible in the user equipment
and network elements being a lightweight and flexible in nature. Backward
compatibility with the legacy network should not be the issue with the avail-
ability of high and powerful resources. In a mobile environment, mobility
management is an interesting issue to deal with. The A interface which is an
interface between mobile switching service switching centre and base station
system which support many application part and Direct Transfer Application
Part (DTAP) is one of them. Mobility management is one of the function-
ality of DTAP. There are many mobility management messages which are
exchanged for identity establishment and access control (AUTHENT REJ,
AUTHENT REQ). As physical layer of the A interface is 2 Mbps digital
connection and DTAP deals with the exchange of layer 3 messages, no major
adaptations are required to make IACAC functional.
As presented in [62], wireless communication and evolution is being
faced by many constraints. These constraints are regulatory constraints like
operating rules on the communication device, pre-decision on the frequency
bands. Layered design of the communication protocol introduces architec-
tural constraints which is important for proliferation. Other constraints are
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Figure 10 Wireless System Evolution [62].
standardization constraints in which particular communication protocol is
developed and operated. The backward compatibility also needs many re-
finements and technological improvements for new standards. There are also
market and social constraints deals with the new applications and the re-
quirements from communication systems. Figure 9 depicts the outline of the
evolution in wireless communications. As shown in the figure, ws1 and ws2
get converged and system ws5 is emerged. When ws4 is evolved, it is not
feasible to implement concept c2 due to heavy constraints as discussed above,
but due to increasing requirements (by ws3 also) the constraints are refined
to change and ws7 is evolved. Over the period of time, some of the wireless
communication systems become obsolete. Example of this obsolete system
is shown in the Figure this happens for ws2. Important point to make a note
here is that the constraints do not allow the concept c3 to be implemented
over the period of time frame as depicted in Figure 10.
Similar to a global Internet scenario, interoperability and Internet working
is ensured by following OSI stack but still there are many exceptions due
to unpredictable nature of wireless interface. This makes more difficult to
guarantee expected quality of service in resource constrained IoT and next
generation networks. Backward compatibility to legacy networks is a chal-
lenge due to lack of cross layer coordination which is a need of today in order
to get performance improvement. Other interoperability and Internet working
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Figure 11 IACAC queuing model.
issues are architecture design and multi-traffic environment. To address these
ensuing issues, more research is needed.
6.2.3 Proposed Mathematical Model for IACAC Queuing Analysis
The proposed IACAC model consists of a trusted third party which is respons-
ible for distributing the ECC parameters to devices trying to communicate to
each other. Devices approaching to KDC for service are managed in queue.
Figure 11 shows the system, where λ is the arrival rate of devices. The inter-
arrival time for devices is exponentially distributed. Thus arrival rate follows
the poisons arrival process. Our system can be modelled with an M/D/1
queuing model with a constant service rate and one server. To evaluate the
system performance, we model the sojourn time, that is, the total time spent
by the device in the system.
The expectation of waiting time for devices in the queue can be as
E[Wq ] = Nq × E[S] + E[R] (4)
where Nq is the mean number of devices in queue; E[S] is the service time
of KDC; and E[R] is the residual time. Thus using Little’s formula [63], the
mean queue length is given as
Nq = λ · E[Wq ] (5)
Therefore,
E[Wq ] = E[R]1 − ρKDC
where the utilization of KDC is given as
ρKDC = λ · E[S]
The residual time Ri is the service time remaining to the customer being
served when the ith device arrives at queue. Figure 12 shows the residual
time in queue at time t .
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Figure 12 Residual time in queue.
The mean residual time can be calculated by dividing the sum of areas of
triangles by the length of interval and is derived as follows:
E[R] = 1
t
∫ t
0
R(t)dt = 1
t
n∑
i=1
1
2
[S2i ]
= n
t
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
1
2
[S2i ]
n
t
→ λ
n∑
i=1
1
2
[S2i ] →
1
2
E[S2]
E[R] = λ · E[S
2]
2
E[Wq ] = λ · E[S
2]
2(1 − ρKDC) (6)
Now, the total time spent by a device in the system (the sojourn time) is
E[T ] = E[Wq ] + E[S]
E[T ] = λ · E[S
2]
2(1 − ρKDC) + E[S] (7)
The total service time comprises of two factors: expectation E[S] and vari-
ance V [S]. The variance is the difference between the mean of squares of the
values and square of mean of values. Therefore V [S] is given as
V [S] = E[S2] − E[S]2 (8)
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For the M/D/1 system, as the service time is constant, variance V [S] = 0 and
results into E[S2] = E[S]2. Thus,
E[T ] = λ · E[S]
2
2(1 − ρKDC) + E[S]
E[T ] =
(
1 + ρKDC
2(1 − ρKDC)
)
· E[S] (9)
By Little’s formula, the mean queue length, the mean number of devices in
queue is given by
Nq = λ · E[Wq ]
Nq = λ2 · E[S]
2
2(1 − ρKDC)
Nq = ρ
2
KDC
2(1 − ρKDC) (10)
Thus, from equations (4) to (10), it can be concluded that the total time
spent by a device in system is the function of the service time E[S] and
the utilization of KDC, ρKDC. The mean queue length and the utilization are
proportional to each other. If the number of devices in queue increases, the
utilization of KDC also increases. For further improvement in the utilization
of KDC, we can pipeline the services of KDC. The services provided by KDC
can be divided in three stages. This will lead to service of three devices at a
time. As shown in Figure 13, the server device will get serviced from server
S1 and will enter the queue for server S2 and so on.
Thus a network of set of single servers in series is formed. The input for
each queue except for the first is the output of the previous queue. The input
to the first queue is Poisson. If the service time of each queue is constant
and the waiting lines are infinite, the output of each queue is a Poisson stream
statistically identical to the input. When this stream is fed into the next queue,
the delays at the second queue are the same as if the original traffic had
bypassed the first queue and fed directly into the second queue. Thus the
queues are independent and may be analysed one at a time. Therefore the
Figure 13 Proposed pipelining of the KDC services.
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waiting time for a device in complete system will be the sum of waiting time
for devices at each subsystem and is shown as
T =
∑
E[Ti]
T =
3∑
i=1
(
1 + ρi
2(1 − ρi)
)
· E[Si] (11)
where ρi is the utilization of server Si and E[Si] is the service time of server
Si .
7 Conclusions and Future Work
A distributed, lightweight and attack resistant solution are the mandatory
properties for the security solution in IoT and puts resilient challenges for au-
thentication and access control of devices. This paper presents an efficient and
secure ECC based integrated authentication and access control protocol. This
paper also presents a mutual authentication protocol and integrated with novel
and secure approach of CAC for access control in IoT along with the imple-
mentation results. Furthermore, this paper presents comparative analysis of
different authentication and access control schemes for IoT. Comparison in
terms of computational time shows that IACAC scheme is efficient as com-
pared to other solution. The protocol is also analyzed for the performance and
security point of view for different possible attacks in IoT scenario. Protocol
evaluation shows that it can defy attacks like DoS, man-in-the-middle and
replay attacks efficiently and effectively. The paper also presents protocol
verification using AVISPA tool which proves that the IACAC protocol is also
efficient in terms of key sharing and authentication. Finally, we also presented
a mathematical model for improving queuing analysis of IACAC.
The future plan is to put this protocol in place with RFID middle-
ware architecture for identity management in IoT. Future work will involve
specification as well as security evaluation of the CAC propagation and revoc-
ation in order to have a complete model of CAC scheme. Another interesting
aspect will be to define and devise a lightweight version of CAC for resource
constrained devices in IoT like sensor nodes. Complete interoperability and
Internet working is still an open research area to take this research further.
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